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COMMENTS
THE EMERGING EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE: A
PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPANDING
EEC-EFTA RELATIONS BEYOND THE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The eighteen countries of Western Europe make up a distinct
economic entity as a result of a highly interdependent trade net-
work. This economic entity is divided into two separate trade blocs,
the European Economic Community ("EEC")' and the European
Free Trade Association ("EFTA").2 Since the early 1970s, the bi-
lateral Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") between the EEC and
the individual EFTA countries3 have provided a foundation for
EEC-EFTA cooperation and led to the development of the world's
largest free trade area for industrial goods."
1. The EEC countries are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and West Germany. Techni-
cally, the EEC is only one of three Communities making up the European Communities. The
European Communities ("EC") comprise: the European Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC"), the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"), and, most importantly,
the EEC. Since the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communi-
ties (entered into force on the same day as the EEC and the Euratom Treaties) and the
Merger Treaty of April 8, 1965, the three Communities have had common institutions: the
Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Assembly (the European Parliament) and the
European Court of Justice. In common parlance, reference to the EEC generally includes the
ECSC and Euratom; therefore, the three communities are referred to interchangeably in this
Comment and elsewhere, as the European Communities, the European Community, the EC,
or the EEC.
2. The EFTA countries are: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzer-
land. Liechtenstein is an associate member of the EFTA by virtue of its 1923 treaty estab-
lishing a customs union with Switzerland. As an associate member, it is represented in the
EFTA by Switzerland as long as the two countries form a customs union and as long as
Switzerland remains a member of the EFTA. Convention, infra note 26, Protocol, arts. 1-2.
3. In Brussels on July 22, 1972, FTAs were signed between the European Communi-
ties and the various EFTA countries. Each EFTA country entered into one FTA with the
EEC and one FTA with the ECSC. This Comment, however, addresses only the FTAs with
the EEC.
4. With a total population of 350 million, the 12 EEC countries and the 6 EFTA
countries make up the world's largest free trade area. Norberg, The Free Trade Agreements
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Today, the relationship between the two trade blocs is on the
verge of entering a new phase as the result of the Luxembourg
Declaration of 1984. In that Declaration, the Ministers from the
EEC, its member states, and the EFTA countries expressed the im-
portance of strengthening cooperation between the two blocs.5 Ac-
cording to the parties, the goal is to expand the relationship beyond
the FTAs and ultimately create a "homogeneous" and "dynamic"
European Economic Space ("EES") a comprising both the EEC and
the EFTA.
The development of the EES can be viewed as a parallel process
to the EEC's creation of its single internal market targeted for
completion by the end of 1992.7 The single internal market calls for
the removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to the free
movement of goods, services, persons and capital (commonly re-
ferred to as the "four freedoms") between the EEC countries. If
of the EFTA Countries with the EC-Experiences and Problems, in 46 INSTITUTET FOR
IMMATERIALRXTT OCH MARKNADSRATT 1, 3 (U. Bernitz ed. 1988) [hereinafter Norberg,
Experiences and Problems]. A "free trade area" can be defined as an area of countries
without internal barriers to trade between them. See infra note 17.
5. As will be discussed, at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on April 9, 1984, it
was recognized that with the removal in early 1984 of the last remaining tariff barriers and
quantitative restrictions on trade in industrial goods, the EEC and the EFTA countries had
achieved the goal set out in the FTAs, i.e., free trade in industrial goods. Due to the success
of the FTAs, the Minsters were convinced that further actions to strengthen cooperation
were in the best interest of all parties. Luxembourg: Ministerial Meeting Between EFTA
Countries and the EC and its Member States, EFTA BULL., No. 2, Apr.-June 1984, at 6-7
[hereinafter Ministerial Meeting].
6. This was the expression used by the Commissioner of the European Communities,
Mr. Willy De Clercq, at the Joint Communique' in Reykjavik on June 5, 1986. Joint Con-
clusions of the Meeting Between EFTA Ministers and Mr. Willy De Clercq of the EC Com-
mission, EFTA BULL., No. 2, Apr.-June 1986, at 2. Throughout the negotiations between
the parties, the phrase "European Economic Space" or "EES" has been used when referring
to this new relationship. Recently, however, Great Britain has objected to the word "space"
and it has proposed that the new relationship be referred to as the "European Economic
Area" or "EEA." Petzell, Ordval Vallar Huvudbry, Svenska Dagbladet, July 26, 1990, § 1,
at 4, col. 4. However, for consistency, the term EES will be used in this Comment.
7. Jonsson, Will EFTA Be Within the Single Market?, EIU EUROPEAN TRENDS, No.
3, 1989, at 55. As will be discussed, the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC, envis-
aged the creation of a single integrated trading area without restrictions on the movement of
goods and obstacles to the free movement of services, persons and capital. See Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958)
(hereinafter Rome Treaty]. In the 1980s, many national barriers to the free movement of
goods, services, persons and capital still existed. In 1985, the Commission of the European
Communities submitted its White Paper to the Council of Ministers of the European Com-
munities. The White Paper presents the program and timetable for the removal of physical,
technical and fiscal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital by
the end of 1992. For the White Paper, see Completing the Internal Market, White Paper
From the Commission to the European Council, 1984-1985 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 310
Final) (1985) [hereinafter White Paper], reprinted in A. WINTER, R. SLOAN, G. LEHNER, &
V. RuIz, EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE app. A (1989) [hereinafter A.
WINTER].
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the EEC and the EFTA countries succeed in implementing the goal
initially expressed in the Luxembourg Declaration, the EFTA
countries, within the context of the EES, will to a limited extent
participate in the four freedoms without membership in the EEC.'
To expand the relationship successfully, however, a new EES
agreement must provide a more comprehensive legal framework
than that provided by the FTAs.9 The FTAs, despite their eco-
nomic importance, do not have adequate procedures for resolving
disputes brought by private parties. Although few disputes have
arisen concerning alleged violations of the FTAs since the agree-
ments came into force, disputes are likely to become more frequent
as the relationship between the two blocs becomes more complex."0
Furthermore, because the courts in the EEC and the EFTA coun-
tries have not treated the FTAs in a unified manner on the issue of
direct effect," a new EES agreement must establish common dis-
pute resolution procedures to ensure that private parties obtain
equal rights and protections.
In his speech to the European Parliament in January of 1989,
Jacques Delors, President of the EEC Commission, presented the
idea of creating a "more structured partnership with common deci-
sion-making and administrative institutions .... .""2 Furthermore,
in talks between the two blocs, the idea of establishing a special
EES Court to handle disputes concerning alleged violations of an
EES agreement has been discussed. 3 However, whether this type
of structured partnership with common administrative and legal in-
stitutions can be established is highly questionable. For reasons that
will be discussed, a new EES agreement might not become more
than an expanded version of the FTAs and serve only as an interim
solution until the EFTA countries become full members of the
8. In addition to participation in the four freedoms, the EES also calls for closer
cooperation in such areas as research, technology, education, environmental and social poli-
cies. EFTA Speaks with One Voice, EFTA BULL., No. 3, July-Sept. 1989, at 1.
9. See Bernitz, Harmonization Between the EEC and the EFTA Countries - The
Role of the Free Trade Agreement, in 46 INSTITUTET FOR IMMATERIALRXTT OCH MARKNAD-
SRATT 88, 88 (U. Bernitz ed. 1988) [hereinafter Bernitz, Harmonization Between the EEC
and the EFTA Countries]. See also Norberg, Rittsliga och Institutionella Fragor i An-
slutning till Skapandet av ett Europeiskt Ekonomiskt Samarbetsomrade (EES), SVENSK
JURISTTIDNING, No. 2, 1990, at 114 [hereinafter Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella
Fragor].
10. See Jonsson, supra note 7, at 58.
11. Direct effect means that a provision of an international agreement can be invoked
by a private party before a domestic court.
12. Rendez-vous at Holmenkollen, EFTA BULL., No. 1, Jan.-Mar. 1989, at 1.
13. Lindmarker, Sverige Mot Ny Europalosning, Svenska Dagbladet, Nov. 7, 1989, §
2, at 6, col. 7 (Interview with Professor Ulf Bernitz, Faculty of Law, Stockholm University).
1990]
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EEC. Should this be the case, this type of an agreement must still
provide a more comprehensive legal framework than that provided
by the FTAs.
This Comment examines the legal framework of the EEC-EFTA
relationship as provided by the FTAs and the nature of the EES,
and proposes measures to establish the more concrete framework
needed for a more complex agreement between the two blocs. Sec-
tion I discusses the history of the relationship between the EEC and
the EFTA countries. Section II examines the FTAs and their legal
status. After an introduction on relevant aspects of international
law, cases are presented to show the differences between the courts
in the EEC and the EFTA countries in giving direct effect to provi-
sions of the FTAs. Section III examines the EES. It discusses the
creation of the EEC's single internal market and the EFTA coun-
tries' participation in this market through an EES agreement. It
also examines the difficulties encountered in the talks between the
two blocs in agreeing on the exact nature of this new expanded
relationship and why an EES agreement might only serve as a tem-
porary solution to the economic integration problems of Western
Europe. Finally, this section proposes that, even though the EES
might only serve as an interim solution, a new EES agreement
must still provide procedures for settling disputes concerning al-
leged violations of EES rules and regulations, and that binding ar-
bitration would be a suitable method for resolving such disputes.
1. HISTORY
Following the end of World War II, U.S. economic aid was of-
fered to the European countries under the Marshall Plan.", One
condition for the aid was that the receiving countries develop a
common recovery program. 5 As a result, on April 16, 1948, the
Organization for European Economic Co-operation ("OEEC") was
established."i This intergovernmental organization took the first
steps toward liberalization of trade; however, the OEEC could not
satisfy those countries that called for an extensive economic part-
nership based on a customs union.17
14. Weiss, The European Free Trade Association After Twenty-five Years, 5 Y.B.
EUR. L. 287, 289 (1985).
15. Id.
16. OEEC was founded by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey
and the United Kingdom.
17. P.J.G KAPTEYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE Eu-
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On the initiative of France, the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity ("ECSC") Treaty was signed on April 18, 1951.18 This
Treaty, in substance, established a customs union for coal and steel
products. 9 Although limited in scope, the Treaty was intended to
provide a "blueprint" for further economic integration between the
member states. Soon afterwards, the ECSC members began negoti-
ations for creating a common market for all economic activities in
general, and a common market for nuclear energy specifically.2" In
Rome, on March 25, 1957, France, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the treaties estab-
lishing the EEC ("Rome Treaty") and the Euratom.2
The OEEC countries that did not join the EEC refused to do so
for a number of reasons." However, the nonparticipants in the
EEC were seriously concerned about the threat of discrimination
towards them in the continued process of liberalizing Western Eu-
ropean trade. 3 In 1957, the British government introduced a plan
to the OEEC which called for the creation of a free trade area
covering both members and non-members of the EEC. The need,
however, for developing the internal structure of the EEC was to
take precedence over any large scale plans, and as a result, the
British plan was abandoned two years later.24
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES, AFTER THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 6
(1989). A number of the OEEC members had signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") on October 30, 1947. Although tariff reduction is one of the aims of the
GATT and it seeks to have each Contracting Party treat all other Contracting Parties
equally with respect to tariffs and other import restriction, Article XXIV allows the forma-
tion of a free trade area or a customs union between certain countries. The difference be-
tween a customs union and a free trade area is that a customs union provides for both the
abolition of internal barriers to trade and the creation of a common customs tariff towards
the rest of the world. A free trade area only provides for the abolition of internal barriers to
trade. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S 194,
270-272.
18. The signatory countries were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and West Germany.
19. Weiss, supra note 14, at 291.
20. A. WINTER, supra note 7, at 5.
21. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the ECSC, EEC and
Euratom. In 1981, Greece became a member of the Communities, and in 1986, Portugal and
Spain joined the Communities.
22. Britain's resistance to European integration was partially due to its desire to main-
tain relations with the Commonwealth and its unwillingness to transfer policy making in the
field of external commercial matters to a common institution. The Scandinavian countries
and Switzerland, traditionally open trading countries with low tariffs, were against member-
ship in the EEC because it would have resulted in increases in their tariffs. Such increases
would have run counter to those countries' normal liberal trade policy. Austria and Switzer-
land could not accept the supranational nature of the EEC as it was incompatible with their
policy of neutrality. Weiss, supra note 14, at 291 n.13.
23. Id. at 291.
24. The End of an Episode, EFTA BULL., No. 7, Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 3.
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Having failed to establish an all-European free trade area, Aus-
tria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom decided to create a free trade area among them-
selves.25 On January 4, 1960, the treaty establishing the EFTA was
signed.26 Although the EFTA did not represent the optimal solution
to the problems of European trade and economic integration, the
main long-term objective of the EFTA was the creation of a free
trade area comprising both the EFTA countries and the EEC
countries."
In December of 1969, at a summit conference, the Heads of
Government of the EEC countries decided to open discussions with
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom for member-
ship in the EEC, and to open discussions with the non-candidate
EFTA countries regarding alternative solutions to the problems of
European trade and economic integration.2" As a result of these
meetings, on January 22, 1972, Denmark, Ireland, Norway29 and
the United Kingdom signed the Accession Treaty for membership
in the EEC, the ECSC and the Euratom. a° On July 22, 1972, FTAs
were signed between the European Communities and the remaining
EFTA countries of Austria, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden and Swit-
zerland."a Although each FTA was negotiated bilaterally, many ar-
25. Weiss, supra note 14, at 291.
26. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention]. On March 1, 1970, Iceland became a member of the
EFTA, and on January 1, 1986, Finland replaced its associate status (in force since June 26,
1971) with full membership in the EFTA. It is important to note the structural differences
between the EEC and the EFTA. In contrast to the EEC, the EFTA has no supranational
structure and no federal political ambitions. Rather, the EFTA is an intergovernmental or-
ganization modeled on the OEEC. References to the OEEC can be found in the Preamble
and Articles 30, 36 and 37 of the Convention.
27. The End of an Episode, supra note 24, at 4. The Preamble to the Convention
establishing the European Free Trade Association states that the EFTA countries have
"[d]etermined to facilitate the early establishment of a multilateral association for the re-
moval of trade barriers and the promotion of closer economic co-operation between the
Members of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, including the Members
of the European Economic Community." Convention,* supra note 26, Preamble.
28. The End of an Episode, supra note 24, at 4.
29. Regarding Norway's application for membership, see infra note 31.
30. The End of an Episode, supra note 24, at 4.
31. At the meeting in Brussels on July 22, 1972, Finland initiated FTAs with the
Communities and later signed the agreements on October 5, 1973. A referendum in Norway
in the fall of 1972 had resulted in a majority against membership in the Communities, and
the Norwegian Government asked for FTAs with the Communities which were signed on
May 14, 1973. Regarding the various FTAs, for Austria see J.O. CoMM. EUR. (No. L 300) 2
(1972); Portugal see J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 301) 165 (1972) (this has now lapsed on
Portuguese accession); Sweden see J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 300) 97 (1972); Switzerland see
JO. COM. EUR. (No. L300) 189 (1972); Finland see O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 328) 2
(1973); Norway see O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 171) 2 (1973); and Iceland see JO. COMM.
EUR. (No. L 301) 2 (1972). Each EFTA country entered into one agreement with the EEC,
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ticles in the agreements are identical. The next section discusses the
FTAs, their legal status and the split between EEC and EFTA
courts when interpreting provisions of these agreements.
II. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR LEGAL STATUS
In general, the FTAs between the EEC and the individual EFTA
countries provided a timetable for the gradual reduction of import
duties imposed on industrial products between the eighteen coun-
tries.3 2 By 1977, virtually all trade in industrial products was free
of custom duties, and on January 1, 1984, tariffs and quantitative
restrictions were completely abolished.33 Thus, the FTAs have re-
sulted in the realization of the EFTA's main ambition: the creation
of a Western European free trade area.
From an economic point of view, the FTAs are of significant im-
portance to both the EEC and the EFTA. In 1987, the EFTA ex-
ported fifty-five percent of its total exports to the EEC, and im-
ported sixty-one percent of its total imports from the EEC.3 ' For
the EEC, the EFTA is the most important export market, account-
ing for a larger share of EEC exports than the United States and
Japan combined. 5
However, from a legal point of view, given the economic impor-
tance of the agreements, the FTAs do not provide a sufficiently
concrete legal framework for EEC-EFTA cooperation. 6 Specifi-
and one agreement with the ECSC. No agreement was entered into with Euratom. For sim-
plicity, any reference to articles in the FTAs will be made to the Swiss FTA which is gener-
ally used in legal literatures as the "master agreement" when presenting the FTAs. For the
Swiss "Master Agreement" see EFTA BULL. No. 8, Nov. 1972, 21 ANNUAIRE EUROPEEN/
EUR. YB. 606 (1975) [hereinafter Master Agreement].
32. Article 3(2) of the FTAs states:
Customs duties on imports shall be progressively abolished in accordance with the
following timetable:
(a) on 1 April 1973 each duty shall be reduced to 80% of the basic duty;
(b) four further reductions of 20% each shall be made on:
I January 1974
1 January 1975
1 January 1976
1 July 1977.
Master Agreement, supra note 31.
33. The FTAs provided that tariffs on certain products which the EEC regarded as
particularly sensitive were to be reduced at a slower rate. Id. Protocol No. 1.
34. In comparison, EFTA's exports to the United States and Japan accounted for 8%
and 2% respectively. The EFTA countries imported 6% of its total imports from the United
States and 5% of its total imports from Japan. Jonsson, supra note 7, at 56.
35. Balstad, A Most Appropriate Time To Meet, EFTA BULL., No. 1, Jan.-Mar.
1989, at 3.
36. See Bernitz, The EEC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements with Special Reference to
the Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries, 23 COMMON MKT. L.
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cally, the FTAs do not provide adequate procedures for resolving
disputes. Despite requests that such procedures be included in the
agreements, the EEC opposed such a solution.3 7 One reason was
that the EEC did not want a system linked to the European Court
of Justice because it wanted the EFTA outside of all EEC institu-
tions .3  A second reason was that an independent dispute resolution
procedure would have conflicted with the Communities' indepen-
dent decisionmaking power.3 9 Consequently, there is no common
procedure for private parties to settle disputes concerning alleged
violations of the FTAs.
On an interstate level, when alleged violations of specific provi-
sions of the FTAs arise, consultation between the EEC and the in-
dividual EFTA country is the primary remedy."' Each FTA con-
tains a provision setting up a Joint Committee,41 consisting of
representatives from both the EEC and the individual EFTA coun-
try.42 However, the Joint Committee is a diplomatic institution
rather than a judicial institution4 3 and resolutions of disputes are
REV. 567, 568-71 (1986) [hereinafter Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scan-
dinavian EFTA Countries). In his article, Bernitz states that "[tihe undeveloped and primi-
tive nature of the Free Trade Agreements from an adjudicatory viewpoint is striking, and
hardly in line with European legal culture of today to exclude any kind of judicial system for
the resolution of disputes in international agreements of this magnitude."
37. During the negotiations of the FTAs, Switzerland and Sweden in particular
wanted some kind of dispute resolution procedure included in the agreements. Id.
38. Id.
39. Of particular concern were the rules of competition. If the EEC had been sub-
jected to arbitration under its FTAs with the individual EFTA countries, there is at least the
possibility that the interpretation and the application of the rules of competition in the Rome
Treaty and the rules of competition in the FTAs would have developed in two different direc-
tions. Norberg, Experiences and Problems, supra note 4, at 11. See also Danelius, Sveriges
Avtal med de Europeiska Gemenskaperna-Juridiska Aspekter, SVENSK JURISTTIDNING,
1973, at 110. However, as will be discussed, today there are a number of various agreements
between the EEC and the EFTA countries which contain independent dispute settlement
procedures.
40. Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries,
supra note 36, at 570.
41. Article 29 of the FTAs states:
1. A Joint Committee is hereby established, which shall be responsible for the ad-
ministration of the Agreement and shall ensure its proper implementation. For this
purpose, it shall make recommendations and take decisions in the cases provided for
in the Agreement. These decisions shall be put into effect by the Contracting Parties
in accordance with their own rules.
2. For the purpose of the proper implementation of the Agreement the Contracting
Parties shall exchange information and, at the request of either Party, shall hold
consultations with the Joint Committee.
3. The Joint Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
Master Agreement, supra note 31.
42. Id. art. 30, § 1.
43. See Norberg, Experiences and Problems, supra note 4, at 11.
[Vol. 21
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1990], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss1/10
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE
conditioned upon mutual agreement." If consultation should fail, a
party may introduce safeguard measures, such as withdrawing
tariff concessions and levying compensatory charges, to counter any
adverse effects resulting from a violation of the agreement.45
Throughout the 1970s, it remained uncertain whether the FTAs
only established legal relations between the EEC and the individual
EFTA states, or whether specific provisions of the FTAs were capa-
ble of producing direct effect so that such provisions could be in-
voked by private parties before domestic courts.46 Today, although
the issue of direct effect has been addressed by courts in the EFTA
countries and by the European Court of Justice, the legal status of
the FTAs remains to some extent uncertain. On the one hand, in
some EFTA countries, provisions of the FTAs do not have direct
effect while in others the issue is unsettled. On the other hand, ac-
cording to the European Court of Justice, some provisions of the
FTAs do have direct effect within the EEC countries. Thus, the
absence of a common institution for resolving disputes has resulted
in the current lack of reciprocity between the courts in the EEC
and the EFTA countries in giving direct effect to provisions of the
FTAs.47
To illustrate the divergence in decisions concerning direct effect
of provisions in the FTAs, the following sections present cases from
the Supreme Courts of the EFTA countries and the European
Court of Justice. To facilitate the understanding of these cases,
some general aspects of international law must first be presented.
A. The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal
Law: The Dualist and the Monist Approach
After a treaty between two or more countries has been ratified, it
is binding upon the contracting parties. According to the Vienna
Convention, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith."4 8 However, how
they carry out their obligations is not the concern of international
44. Master Agreement, supra note 31, art. 30, § 2.
45. Id. art. 27, § 3(a).
46. Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries,
supra note 36, at 571.
47. N. WAHL, THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EC AND EFTA COUN-
TRIES 83 (44 Institutet fdr Immaterialratt och Marknadsrdtt 1988).
48. Vienna Convention, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 679. This is a basic principle of international law and referred to as pacta sunt
servanda. M. JANIS. AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1988).
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law.4 Therefore, under international law, a state's obligation to
recognize a treaty is not the responsibility of any particular institu-
tion of its government. Consequently, domestic courfs are not obli-
gated to apply and give direct effect to a treaty. Whether domestic
courts can give direct effect to a treaty depends upon which of two
approaches the state uses in implementing international law into
municipal law: the dualist or the monist approach.50
According to the dualist approach, international law and munici-
pal law operate within separate spheres. 51 In order for a domestic
court to apply and give direct effect to an international rule of law,
that particular rule of law must first be implemented into the coun-
try's municipal legal system. Implementation can be done through
either a "transformation 52 or an "incorporation. 53
While the monist approach appears in many different forms, all
forms of monism consider international law and municipal law as
part of one single legal system.54 Therefore, under the monist ap-
proach, after ratification, a treaty automatically becomes part of
the nation's municipal legal order without any further governmen-
tal action and courts may give a provision direct effect.55
Article 228(1) of the Rome Treaty56 sets forth the procedures for
negotiating and ratifying an international agreement to which the
EEC is a party. Article 228(2) then states: "[a]greements con-
cluded under the conditions laid down [in Article 228(1)] shall be
binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member
States.' '57 Therefore, since an international agreement automati-
cally becomes binding on the EEC without an act of implementa-
tion, it can be concluded that the EEC adheres to the monist the-
ory.58 That the EEC adheres to the monist theory is also supported
49. N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 1.
50. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIAL 140 (2d ed. 1987). Dualism and monism should not be viewed as absolute
concepts. Rather, they should be regarded as merely an indication of a State's approach to
implementing a treaty into municipal law. See N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 3.
51. N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 2.
52. Under the transformation technique, which is usually used when the treaty is not
compatible with existing municipal law, the government transforms the treaty into the mu-
nicipal legal order through a translation or a reformulation of the treaty provisions. Id. at 4.
53. Under the incorporation technique, which is usually used when the treaty is com-
patible with existing municipal law, the government passes a law which incorporates the
treaty provisions into municipal law. Id.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, at 90.
57. Id.
58. See N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 11. This, however, does not mean that all of the
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by Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C. A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a. A., 5"
where the European Court of Justice, citing R. & V. Haegman v.
Belgian State,60 held that international agreements "form an inte-
gral part of Community law." 61
Among the EFTA countries, however, some follow the dualist
approach in implementing international law into the country's mu-
nicipal legal order while others follow the monist approach. The
EFTA countries adhering to the dualist approach are Finland, Ice-
land, Norway and Sweden. 2 In Finland, the FTA has been imple-
mented into municipal law. 3 In Iceland, Norway, and Sweden,
however, the FTAs have not been implemented into municipal
law. 4 Austria and Switzerland adhere to the monist approach.
Therefore, the FTAs are part of the municipal legal order of both
Austria and Switzerland. 5
As can be seen above, in a monist country after ratification, and
in a dualist country after implementation, a treaty becomes part of
the state's municipal legal order and is thus directly applicable1 6
Although a treaty provision must be directly applicable in order to
produce any form of direct effect, direct applicability is no guaran-
tee for the provision having direct effect.6 7 Whether a provision of a
treaty is meant to confer rights to individuals is ultimately a ques-
tion for the nation's courts to decide.6 8
In conclusion, among the EFTA countries, the FTAs have not
been implemented into the municipal legal orders of Iceland, Nor-
way and Sweden.6 9 Thus, provisions of the FTAs are unable to pro-
individual EEC countries adhere to the monist theory.
59. Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C. A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a. A., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3641.
60. R. & V. Haegman v. Belgian State, 1974 Recueil 449, 459.
61. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3662.
62. N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 7-9.
63. In implementing the FTA into Finnish municipal law, a transformation of the
FTA was made by a publication in the Official Gazette. Bernitz, The Position of Sweden
and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries, supra note 36, at 581.
64. N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 8-10.
65. Id. at 6, 10.
66. It is important to distinguish between "direct effect" and "direct applicability."
Direct effect means that a treaty provision may be invoked by a private party before a do-
mestic court. Direct applicability simply means that a treaty provision is part of a country's
municipal legal system. For a discussion on direct effect and direct applicability, see gener-
ally Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect Two Distinct and Different Concepts in
Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425 (1972).
67. N. WAHL, supra note 47, at 14.
68. Id. at 15. For the test used by the European Court of Justice in determining
whether a treaty provision should be given direct effect, see infra notes 100-101 and accom-
panying text.
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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duce any direct effect in those countries. In Finland, the FTA has
been transformed into municipal law.7 However, whether or not
provisions of the FTA have direct effect is unclear because no case
so far has addressed the issue. 71 In the EFTA countries of Austria
and Switzerland, the FTAs are part of those countries' municipal
legal systems. 72 Furthermore, within the EEC, the FTAs form an
integral part of the law of the Communities. 73 The issue whether
provisions of the FTAs have direct effect in Austria and Switzer-
land has been addressed by those countries' Supreme Courts. Also,
whether provisions of the FTAs have direct effect within the EEC
has been addressed by the European Court of Justice. The next
sections discuss these cases.
B. The Issue of Direct Effect and the Position of the EFTA
Courts
The issue concerning direct effect of provisions of the FTAs was
addressed by the Swiss Supreme Court in Bosshard Partners Inter-
trading AG v. Sunlight AG. 7" In Bosshard Partners, the plaintiff
marketed a detergent under the trademark OMO which was exclu-
sively manufactured and sold in Switzerland. Meanwhile, the de-
fendant was selling detergent of German origin under the name of
OMO to Swiss wholesale distributors. The Plaintiff argued that the
defendant violated section 24(c) of the Swiss Trade Mark Protec-
tion Act."' The defendant, however, argued that, based on Article
1371 (read together with Article 2077) of the FTA between Switzer-
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. Bernitz, Sveriges EG-Anknytning i Rattsligt Perspektiv, I JURIDISK TIDSKRIFT,
47, 65 (1989-90) [hereinafter Bernitz, Sveriges EG-Anknytning].
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
74. Bosshard Partners lntertrading AG v. Sunlight AG, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 664
(1980).
75. Section 24(c) of the Trade Mark Protection Act (MSchG) provides that "any per-
son who sells, offers for sale or brings into circulation products or goods which to his knowl-
edge bear a trade mark which is copied, imitated or unlawfully affixed to or printed on the
articles in question, may be sued under civil law." Bosshard Partners, 3 Common Mkt. L.R.
at 667.
76. Article 13 of the FTAs states:
1. No new quantitative restriction on imports or measures having equivalent effect
shall be introduced in trade between the Community and Switzerland.
2. Quantitative restrictions on imports shall be abolished on 1 January 1973 and any
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports shall be
abolished not later than 1 January 1975.
Master Agreement, supra note 31.
77. Article 20 of the FTAs states:
The Agreements shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or
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land and the EEC,7" the plaintiff did not have a valid cause of
action.79
The Swiss Supreme Court held that Article 13 of the FTA be-
tween Switzerland and the EEC did not have direct effect.8 0 The
Court reasoned that, based on legislative history, the objective of
the FTA was not "to create a uniform internal market with supra-
national regulations governing competition, but merely a free-trade
area." '81 Therefore, the FTA "does not compel Switzerland to har-
monize its economic policies and domestic legislation with those of
the EEC."82 In addition, the provisions of Article 13 were only ad-
dressed to the Swiss legislature and administration, and they did
not give a private party any rights which could be invoked against
Swiss trademark laws.8 3 Thus, Article 13 of the Swiss FTA with
the EEC does not have direct effect in Switzerland.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Austrian Supreme
Court in Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur Verwaltung und Aus-
wertung Mechanicsh-Musikalischer Urheberrechte GmbH. v.
Gramola A, Winter & Co.84 In Austro-Mechana, the plaintiff, a
copyright company, had contracted with composers for the rights to
their musical works in exchange for a royalty. The defendant, how-
ever, was importing records from West Germany which were copy-
right protected in both Austria and Germany. The plaintiff argued
goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, law and order or public
security, the protection of life and health of humans, animals or plants, the protec-
tion of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value, the protection
of industrial and commercial property, or rules relating to gold or silver. Such
prohibitions or restrictions must not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties.
Master Agreement, supra note 31.
78. For the FTA between Switzerland and the EEC, see supra note 31.
79. Article 13 refers to "restrictions on imports or measures having equivalent effect"
i.e. restrictions on imported "goods" or measures having equivalent effect. Defendant argued
that Article 13 should be read together with Article 20 which provides an exception to the
general rule laid down in Article 13. According to defendant, because Article 20 also re-
ferred to industrial property, Article 13's reference to "measures having similar effect" were
intended to cover industrial property and not only goods. Bosshard Partners, 3 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 673.
80. Bosshard Partners, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 664.
81. Id. at 674. The Court also stated that even if Article 13 of the FTA was directly
effective, it would only apply to measures directly affecting the import of goods; it would not
apply to industrial property (i.e. trademark rights). Article 20 permits import restrictions
which are justified for the protection of industrial property and therefore overrides Article
13. Id. at 675.
82. Id. at 674.
83. Id. at 675.
84. Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur Verwaltung und Auswertung Mechanicsh-
Musikalischer Urheberrechte GmbH. v. Gramola A. Winter & Co., 2 Common Mkt. L.R.
626 (1984).
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that under the Austrian Copyright Act, it had the exclusive right to
circulate its clients' works and that it had not given its consent to
the defendant's circulation of the records in Austria. The defendant
argued that this violated the rules of competition85 of the FTA be-
tween Austria and the EEC.8
The Austrian Supreme Court held that the competition provi-
sions of the FTA "did not apply to the creation and exercise of
copyright."87 Because the defendant had not stated any arguments
why the exercise of circulation rights would be contrary to Aus-
tria's FTA with the EEC, the Court, in its reasoning, contented
itself with a reference to a statement by Dittrich, an Austrian
scholar.88 According to Dittrich, "the creation and exercise of copy-
rights in the widest sense are not subject to the [FTA]" and, specif-
ically, the Austrian Copyright Act is not overridden by the FTA.89
Thus, although the Court did not explicitly rule on the issue of di-
rect effect, the decision can be viewed as a denial of the direct ef-
fect of the competition provisions under Article 23 of the FTA be-
tween Austria and the EEC.90
In summary, of the three EFTA countries capable of giving di-
85. The rules of competition are contained in Article 23 of the FTA. It provides:
1. The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement in
so far as they may affect trade between the Community and [Austria]:
(i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition as regards the production of
or trade in goods;
(ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories of
the Contracting Parties as a whole or in a substantial part thereof;
(iii) any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.
Master Agreement, supra note 31.
86. For the FTA between Austria and the EEC, see supra note 30.
87. Austro-Mechana, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 626.
88. DITTRICH, DIE VERTRXGE OSTERREICHS MIT DEN EUROPKISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
UND DAS OSTERREICHISCHE URHEBERRECHT 81 (1977), cited in Austro-Mechana, 2 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 639.
89. Austro-Mechana, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 638-39.
90. The Court's holding in Austro-Mechana is not clear, and legal scholars seem di-
vided on the issue whether Article 23 has direct effect. In his article, Olivier Jacot-Guil-
larmod appears to take the position that Austro-Mechana stands for a denial of direct effect
of Article 23. Judicial Protectionism: Legal Fate Political Challenge to Free Trade in Eu-
rope? EFTA BULL., No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1985, at 8. Furthermore, Bernitz seems to have
adopted this position. See Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian
EFTA Countries, supra note 36, at 571. However, Wahl argues that the Court might have
considered the exercise of copyrights to be justified under Article 20 which allows for
"prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of
public morality, law and order or public security .. " Therefore, it was unnecessary for the
Court to determine whether Article 23 should have direct effect. N. WAHL, supra note 47, at
62-63.
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rect effect to provisions in the FTAs, i.e., Austria, Finland and
Switzerland, two have refused to give direct effect to particular pro-
visions, and the third has not addressed the issue. Therefore, be-
cause the remaining EFTA countries cannot give direct effect to
provisions of the FTAs due to a lack of implementation of the
agreements into municipal law, provisions of the FTAs most likely
cannot be invoked by a private party in an EFTA court.9 ' The next
section shows the EEC's different attitude towards giving direct ef-
fect to provisions of the FTAs.
C. The Issue of Direct Effect and the Position of the European
Court of Justice
Whether provisions of the FTAs are capable of producing direct
effect within the EEC was first addressed by the European Court of
Justice in Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a.
A.92 In Kupferberg, the plaintiff was importing port wine from Por-
tugal (at that time a member of the EFTA) into West Germany.
Under German law,9 3 the spirit surcharge was, under certain condi-
tions, reduced on spirits produced by domestic distilleries. The
plaintiff argued that the refusal to extend this reduction to im-
ported port wine was a violation of Article 1811 of the FTA be-
tween the EEC and Portugal. 95
The Court held that Article 18 of the FTA between the EEC and
Portugal was directly applicable and capable of conferring rights
upon individual traders which the courts must protect.9 Part of the
Court's rationale was that, under R. & V. Haegman v. Belgian
State,97 agreements concluded by the Community "form an inte-
91. In his article, Oliver Jacot-Guillarmod refers to the attitude taken by the EFTA
countries as "judicial protectionism." Jacot-Guillarmod, supra note 90, at 9.
92. Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a. A., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3641. The issue whether a provision of the FTAs could have direct effect was raised in
a preceding case, Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Lim-
ited and Simons Records Limited, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 329. However, the European
Court of Justice in deciding the case avoided ruling on the issue.
93. Branntweinmonopolgesetz (Law on the Monopoly in Spirits).
94. The provision in dispute, Article 18, paragraph 1 provided that "[t]he Contracting
Parties shall refrain from any measure or practice of an internal fiscal nature establishing,
whether directly or indirectly, discrimination between the products of one Contracting Party
and like products originating in the territory of the other Contracting Party." Master Agree-
ment, supra note 31. It should be noted that the above language was set forth in Article 21
of the FTA between the EEC and Portugal. However, for consistency, Article 18 of the
Master Agreement will be used when referring to this provision.
95. For the FTA between the EEC and Portugal, see supra note 31.
96. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3666.
97. R. & V. Haegman v. Belgian State, 1974 Recueil 449, 459.
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gral part of the Community legal system"98 and are binding on
Community institutions as well as upon member countries.99 Fur-
thermore, for a provision of Community law to have direct effect, it
must be (1) unconditional and (2) sufficiently precise.100 To make
this determination, the provision must be analyzed "in the light of
both the object and purpose of the Agreement and of its con-
text." 10 1 Here, the aim of the agreement was to create a free trade
system, and because Article 18 furthered this objective and was un-
conditional and sufficiently precise, it was given direct effect.' 012
D. Some General Remarks Regarding the Experience with the
FTAs and Changes That Must Take Place for an EES
Agreement To Succeed
Under the Kupferberg rationale, in addition to Article 18 of the
FTAs, a number of other provisions should also have direct effect
within the EEC countries.10 3 Thus, after the Kupferberg decision, it
is now possible for an EFTA exporter, provided that standing re-
quirements are met, to invoke provisions of the FTAs before domes-
tic courts in all EEC countries and, if necessary, before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.' In contrast, an EEC exporter most likely
would not succeed in invoking specific provisions of the FTAs
before the courts in Austria and Switzerland due to the restrictive
position taken by those courts. Furthermore, in the remaining
EFTA countries, with the exception of Finland, direct effect cannot
98. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3662.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 3665.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The following provisions should have direct effect under the "unconditional and
sufficiently precise" rationale set forth in the Kupferberg decision: (a) Article 3(1), which
prohibits the introduction of customs duties on imports; (b) Article 6(1), which prohibits the
introduction of charges having the equivalent effect of customs duties on imports; (c) Article
7(1), which prohibits the introduction of customs duties on exports or charges having the
equivalent effect; (d) Article 13(1), which prohibits the introduction of quantitative restric-
tions on imports or measures having the equivalent effect; (e) Article 18(2), which prohibits
the repayment of internal taxation in excess of the amount of direct or indirect taxation
imposed on exports; (f) Article 19(1), which prohibits restrictions on payments of goods and
transfer of such payments to the state where the creditor resides; (g) Article 19(2), which
prohibits restrictions on short and medium-term financing of commercial transactions. Arti-
cle 20 states the exceptions to Article 13(1); thus, if Article 13(1) has direct effect, then
Article 20 most likely has direct effect. Article 25, which deals with dumping, would proba-
bly also be given direct effect. Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian
EFTA Countries, supra note 36, at 574-75.
104. Under Article 177 of the Rome Treaty, a case may be transferred from a domes-
tic court within the EEC to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on EEC
law. Rome Treaty supra note 7, at 76-77.
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be given due to a lack of implementation. Consequently, EFTA
traders have an unfair advantage over EEC traders and this unfair
advantage will continue under a new EES agreement unless
changes are made by the EFTA countries.
Before discussing the changes that must take place for an EES
agreement to succeed, it must be noted that it is not clear how a
new EES agreement would treat the FTAs. A new EES agreement
will likely cover a substantial portion of the content contained in
the FTAs and the numerous separate bilateral agreements entered
into by the parties over the years.10 5 Although it would be theoreti-
cally possible to substitute these agreements with one EES agree-
ment, the former agreements may remain in force since their depth
and specifics might be difficult to capture in one single agree-
ment.1 06 The following proposal assumes that the FTAs and other
bilateral agreements will continue to remain in force following the
conclusion of an EES agreement; thus any reference to EES
"rules" and "regulations" will include rules and regulations covered
by the FTAs and other bilateral agreements.
As was discussed above, there is today no uniform treatment of
the FTAs by the courts in the EEC and the EFTA countries re-
garding the issue of direct effect. However, the EES must, as one of
its main prerequisites, have the creation of virtually identical condi-
tions for economic operations in all eighteen EEC and EFTA coun-
tries. 10 7 Thus, for the EES to function properly as a vehicle for the
EFTA countries' participation in the EEC's single internal market,
it is essential that provisions of an EES agreement would be given
direct effect by the courts in all eighteen countries provided that
the particular provision was unconditional and sufficiently pre-
cise.' °8 This requires a change in the position taken by the courts in
Austria and Switzerland regarding the legal status of its respective
agreements with the EEC,'0° whether in the form of a future EES
agreement, the FTAs, or any other bilateral agreement. As to the
remaining EFTA countries, an EES agreement, the FTAs, and
other bilateral agreements must be implemented into those coun-
tries' municipal legal orders.1
105. Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 116.
106. Id. at 117.
107. Norberg, Experiences and Problems, supra note 4, at 14.
108. See Norberg, Rttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 120.
109. See Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Coun-
tries, supra note 36, at 590.
110. For the importance of implementing provisions of the FTAs into municipal law in
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Concerning the implementation of international agreements into
a country's municipal legal order, although the Kupferberg decision
did not explicitly demand reciprocity from the EFTA countries,'11
voices have been raised from the EEC side regarding some EFTA
countries' treatment of the FTAs. According to Judge Pierre Pes-
catore,'12 the legal status of the FTAs in Sweden is "deplorable"
and a form of judicial barrier towards the EEC.' 3 Therefore, in
order for the EEC-EFTA relationship to expand in a timely and
harmonious manner, a future EES agreement, the FTAs, and other
bilateral agreements must be implemented into the municipal legal
orders of all EFTA countries.
However, implementing the EES agreement, the FTAs, and
other bilateral agreements into the municipal legal systems of all
EFTA countries is only the first step in providing a more concrete
legal framework for, expanded EEC-EFTA cooperation. If these
agreements become an integral part of the municipal law in all
EFTA countries, provisions of these agreements are then capable of
producing direct effect within both the EEC and the EFTA coun-
tries. This does not, however, mean that all courts will interpret
provisions in a similar manner. For example, even though a provi-
sion has been properly implemented in both country A and country
B, the courts of country A may give direct effect to the provision
while the courts in country B may not give direct effect to the same
provision. Furthermore, even if both the courts in country A and
country B would give the provision direct effect, they might still
all EFTA countries, see Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA
Countries, supra note 36, at 590; Bernitz, Harmonization Between the EEC and the EFTA
Countries, supra note 9, at 99. For the need of the EFTA countries to implement provisions
of an EES agreement into their municipal legal orders, see Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institu-
tionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 120.
111. In their amicus briefs, Denmark and France argued that the FTA between the
EEC and Portugal was based on the principle of reciprocity. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. at 3650.
112. Former Judge of the European Court of Justice and one of the judges involved in
the Kupferberg decision.
113. Bernitz, Sveriges EG-Anknytning, supra note 71, at 65. In an article written by
Judge Pescatore following the Kupferberg decision, he stated that "[direct effect] means that
legal rules, by their very nature, have practical purpose. Any legal rule is devised so as to
operate effectively .... If it is not operative, it is not a rule of law. The task of lawyers is
therefore not to thwart effects of legal rules, but to help in putting them into operation. In
other words, practical operation for all concerned, which is nothing else than 'direct effect,'
must be considered as being the normal condition of any rule of law. The non-operation of a
rule of law appears thus to be not an ordinary phenomenon, but a real antinomy in the legal
system. In other words, 'direct effect' must be presumed, it has not to be established a pri-
ori." Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect". An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8
EUR. L. REV. 155, 155 (1983).
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interpret the provision differently as to what type of conduct the
provision prohibits. Therefore, a common forum to settle disputes
arising under an EES agreement must be established to ensure pri-
vate parties equal rights and protections. Before a proposal for a
common dispute resolution procedure is presented, a general over-
view of the EES will first be given.
III. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE
The desire to expand the relationship between the EEC and the
EFTA countries was indicated for the first time in the Luxembourg
Declaration of April 9, 1984.114 At the Luxembourg meeting, Min-
isters from the EEC, its member states, and the EFTA countries
recognized that with the removal in early 1984 of the last remain-
ing tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions affecting trade in in-
dustrial products, the EEC and the EFTA countries had achieved
the goal set out in the FTAs, i.e., free trade in industrial goods. 11 5
The agreements had contributed to an increase in trade between
the countries concerned and had led to the economic recovery fol-
lowing economic difficulties and protectionist pressures during the
early 1970s. The Ministers were therefore convinced that ex-
panding the relationship beyond the FTAs, with the goal of ulti-
mately creating a dynamic European Economic Space, was in the
best interest of all parties. 16
Since the Luxembourg Declaration, the EEC and the EFTA
countries have conducted joint negotiations to find common solu-
tions to the problems of economically integrating the two blocs in
order to establish a "homogeneous" and "dynamic" EES. 117 The
exact nature of the EES has yet to be defined. However, as noted
earlier, the EES can be viewed as a parallel process to the EEC's
development of its single internal market program. The goal of the
EEC's program is to remove all physical, technical, and fiscal barri-
ers to the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital be-
tween member countries. The next sections examine the EEC's pro-
gram for establishing the single internal market, and the EFTA's
participation in the single market through an EES agreement.
114. Ministerial Meeting, supra note 5, at 6.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 6-7.
117. Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 111.
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A. 1992: The Completion of the EEC Single Internal Market
The idea of creating a single market without economic frontiers
is not new. Article 2 of the Rome Treaty calls for the establishment
of a "Common Market.""' 8 Article 3 provides for the elimination,
as between member states, of customs duties and quantitative re-
strictions to the free movement of goods, and obstacles to the free
movement of services, persons and capital.119
Significant progress was made during the early years following
the signing of the Rome Treaty. 2 ' The common customs tariff was
completed and internal tariffs and quotas were removed. However,
progress slowed and eventually stopped. The economic recessions of
the 1970s, followed by protectionist measures inside as well as
outside the EEC and the addition of new member countries, were
some of the factors that contributed to the failure to complete the
common market. 1' Thus, rather than acting as a true common
market as envisaged by the Rome Treaty, the EEC was still acting
as twelve separate countries. 2
The fragmentation of markets was the single most important rea-
son for Europe's poor economic performance during the early
1980s.123 The need for completing the common market to remain
competitive was recognized by the member states, and in 1985, the
Commission of the European Communities presented its White Pa-
per to the Council of the European Communities. The White Paper
presents the program and timetable for achieving a fully unified
internal market by 1992.124 It identifies three categories of barriers
to be abolished by 1992: physical, technical and fiscal barriers.
The physical barriers to be abolished are customs posts and im-
migration controls. Customs posts cause delays and thereby impose
a burden on cross-border commerce. This adds to costs and dam-
118. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, at 15. For a discussion on the EEC's single internal
market, see generally Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practi-
tioner's Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 357 (1989); Schildhaus, 1992 and
the Single European Act, 23 INT'L LAw. 549 (1989); Fine, Countdown to 1992: Introduction
to the Single Market, 5 CORP. COUNS. Q. 52 (1989); Jarvis, American Business and the
Single European Act: Scaling the Walls of Fortress Europe, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 227
(1990).
119. Rome Treaty, supra note 7, at 15.
120. Ayral, The European Economic Space-Characteristics and Outlooks from an
EC Point of View, in 46 INSTITUTET FOR IMMATERIALRXTT OCH MARKNADSRXTT 20, 21 (U.
Bernitz ed. 1988).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. White Paper, supra note 7 3.
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ages competitiveness. Immigration controls prevent people from
moving freely across the borders within the Community and are the
most visible sign of the continued division of the Community. Thus,
their removal would be the clearest sign of a true common
market. 12 5
Technical barriers are the result of different product regulations
and standards. These barriers distort production patterns, increase
costs, and force manufactures to "focus on national rather than
continental markets."12 As a result, Community industries are un-
able to benefit from economies of scale offered by a unified
market.127
The last types of barriers to be abolished are the fiscal barriers.
These barriers include different rates of indirect taxes-value-
added taxes ("VAT") and excises taxes-which affect prices on
goods and services.'28 To achieve a true common market, measures
will be taken to harmonize such indirect tax rates.129
To achieve the internal market by 1992, the Heads of State of
the EEC countries agreed to the Single European Act, which be-
came effective on July 1, 1987.130 One of the Act's primary objec-
tives is to implement the recommendations in the White Paper to
achieve a single market by 1992.111 It should be noted that "Euro-
125. , Id. % 24.
126. Id. 1 60.
127. Id.
128. As indicated earlier, physical barriers are to be removed to facilitate the free
movement of goods, services and persons. However, as these frontier controls are designed to
ensure that each member state can collect indirect taxes in the form of VAT and excise
duties, measures must be taken so that countries can still collect indirect taxes absent fron-
tier controls. Therefore, sales and purchases across borders must be treated the same way as
if the sale or purchase took place within the borders. Id. 172.
129. The plan calls for approximation of the various VAT and excise tax rates (in
1985, VAT rates ranged from zero to 38%. Id. 11 198). In terms of VAT, the various rates
would be "approximated" through the use of a range of permitted VAT rates. A clearing-
house system would be set up to ensure that the VAT collected in the exporting state and
deducted in the importing state as a tax credit would be reimbursed to the latter. Id. 172.
In terms of excise tax, the tax levied on various products (e.g., tobacco products, alcoholic
beverages and mineral oils) would be harmonized. Id. Furthermore, an interlinking system
for Community bonded warehouses would be set up. Id. 184. When goods are exported
they are generally exported "in bond." That is to say, the duty is suspended and canceled
after proof of export. This requires frontier controls. To avoid this, goods would be received
into bonded warehouses and the duty would then be charged when the goods are delivered
from the bonded warehouse to distributors or directly to consumers. Id. 1 180.
130. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 3 (1987),
reprinted in A. WINTER, supra note 7, app. B.
131. The Single European Act is not limited to facilitate the accomplishment of the
objectives set forth in the White Paper. More importantly, it amends the Rome Treaty in
very important respects. Chapter II of Title II of the Act contains the amendments to the
Treaty and it is subdivided into two sections. Section I covers the institutional provisions.
Section II covers provisions relating to the foundations and policy of the Community, and it
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pean unification did not begin with the Treaties of Rome, nor will
the process be completed on December 31, 1992. The 1992 pro-
gram is, however, the latest chapter in the history of efforts aimed
at European integration ... .
B. The EFTA's Participation in the Single Market Through an
EES Agreement
Although the single market is primarily an internal goal of the
EEC, both the EEC and the EFTA countries have recognized that
the process of creating a single market should not stop at the bor-
ders of the Community."a Barriers to trade should be removed if
mutually beneficial; thus, the EEC has invited the EFTA countries
to participate in the single internal market."" If the EEC and the
EFTA countries succeed in implementing the goals initially set out
in the Luxembourg Declaration, the EFTA countries, within the
context of the EES, will to a limited extent participate in the four
freedoms13 5 without membership in the EEC.13 6
On January 17, l989, Jacques Delors, President of the EEC
Commission, stated in his speech to the European Parliament in
Strasbourg that the EEC and the EFTA, as one alternative, could
"look for a new, more structured partnership with common deci-
sion-making and administrative institutions to make our activities
more effective and to highlight the political dimension of our coop-
is divided into six sub-sections. Sub-section I covers the internal market; sub-section II, mon-
etary capacity; sub-section III, social policy; sub-section IV, economic and social cohesion;
sub-section V, research and technological development, and sub-section VI, environment. See
generally, Single European Act, supra note 130.
132. A. WINTER, supra note 7, at 4.
133. Ayral, supra note 120, at 20.
134. Id.
135. The degree of the EFTA's participation in the free movement of goods, services,
persons and capital will be the subject of extensive negotiations over the next years. Unequal
Partners, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1989, at 62.
136. The issue of the EFTA countries applying for EEC membership will be discussed
in a later section. However, it should be mentioned here that the attitude towards member-
ship has significantly changed since the idea of the EES was created in 1984. Austria has
already applied for membership. In Finland, membership is being discussed as a distant, but
realistic, possibility. In Sweden, the ruling Social Democratic party has insisted that mem-
bership in the EEC would be against the country's neutrality policy. The Norseman
Cometh?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1990, at 50. However, the Swedish Prime Minister's
recent statements concerning the EEC-Sweden relationship have been interpreted by some as
meaning that Sweden is now getting closer to EEC membership. In Switzerland, according
to some leaders, Switzerland is no longer excluding the possibility of EEC membership.
However, the EEC has made it clear that it will not accept new members before the internal
market is completed and Spain and Portugal have been integrated into the Community.
EES-Avtal kan Bara bli Tillftdllig Lbisning, AFFXRSVXRLDEN, No. 26-32, June 27, 1990, at
26.
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eration in the economic, social, financial and cultural spheres. 13 7
At the EFTA Summit in Oslo on March 14-15, 1989, the Heads of
Government of the EFTA countries declared their commitment "to
explore together with the EC ways and means to achieve a more
structured partnership with common decision-making and adminis-
trative institutions."1 8 This lead to the creation of the joint EFTA-
EEC High-Level Steering Group ("HLSG"), which in turn set up
five working groups on: (1) the free movement of goods; (2) the
free movement of services and capital; (3) the free movement of
persons; (4) legal and institutional issues; and (5) policy questions
such as environmental, educational and social aspects.139 The work
within the HLSG was completed on October 20, 1989, at which
time both sides declared that there were good reasons for continu-
ing the integration process. 1 0 At the joint ministerial meeting in
Brussels on December 19, 1989, it was decided to commence nego-
tiations for an EES Agreement in early 1990 with the goal of hav-
ing an agreement in force by January 1, 1993.141
It must be emphasized that the talks between the two blocs have
been of an informal, open and non-binding character. The purpose
has been to determine and analyze the various options for ex-
panding the relationship." 2 The following sections discuss issues
that have been raised during negotiations between the parties con-
cerning the nature of an EES agreement and the institutional ar-
rangements as a prelude to the proposal of establishing an arbitra-
tion procedure to strengthen the legal framework of a new
agreement.
1. The Nature of an EES Agreement. Regarding the identity of
the contracting parties to an EES agreement, on the EEC side, the
Community as such will most likely be the representing party.143
On the EFTA side, the contracting parties will be made up of each
of the six EFTA countries along with Liechtenstein.1 44 In contrast
137. Rendez-vous at Holmenkollen, supra note 12, at 1.
138. Two Tracks to Progress, EFTA BULL., No. 2, Apr.-June 1989, at 1.
139. EFTA Speaks with One Voice, supra note 8, at 1.
140. UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, SVERIGE-EFTA-EG 1989: DET VXSTEUROPEISKA IN-
TEGRATIONSARBETET 15 (1990).
141. Id. at 16.
142. Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 113.
143. The possibility of the individual EEC countries as signatories is something that
needs to be studied. The Community as such has wide ranging powers when it comes to
entering into international agreements. However, there are conflicting opinions concerning
these powers and the equivalent powers of the individual EEC countries. Id. at 114.
144. Id. at 115.
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to the EEC, the EFTA as an organization does not have the compe-
tence to enter into international agreements.'" However, although
an EES agreement would be concluded between the EEC on the
one side, and the individual EFTA countries on the other side, it
has been agreed that the EFTA countries under an EES agreement
would act jointly and "speak with one voice."' 46
Concerning the areas to be covered by a new agreement, accord-
ing to the EFTA Summit in Oslo, an EES agreement would, to the
fullest possible extent, cover the four freedoms and other areas such
as "research, technology, education, environment, social policy as-
pects and transport. 1 17 The EFTA countries have, during the ne-
gotiations, presented long and detailed lists of exceptions from the
EEC's laws governing such areas as agriculture, fishing, and the
free movement of persons, labor, capital and transport. 48 However,
the EEC has made it clear that it will only accept a minimum of
exceptions if such exceptions are of deep national interest, and any
exceptions granted will only be for a transitional period. 149
In order for the EES to become "dynamic" and "homogeneous,"
it is essential that a new agreement not become static in nature but
rather flexible in order for it to evolve as relations between the two
blocs change.' 50 Thus, a new agreement must provide procedures
for the treatment of "secondary" EES rules once an agreement
with the "primary" rules has been concluded. In other words, as
the EEC enacts new rules and regulations concerning its single in-
ternal market and which also affect the EES, these rules and regu-
145. Id.
146. Id. During the meetings of the joint EFTA-EEC High-Level Steering Group cre-
ated in April of 1989, the EEC expressed the wish to deal with only one party-the EFTA as
such-rather than to deal separately with the individual member countries. Thus, the EFTA
countries were to speak "with one voice" which they were successful in doing during these
negotiations. EFTA Speaks with One Voice, supra note 8, at 1. However, as will be dis-
cussed, the EEC has demanded that the EFTA countries continue to act jointly in the future
and this requires a stronger internal structure of the EFTA as such. Paketldsning som Bade
Lockar och Skrilmmer, AFFARSVRLDEN, No. 21, May 23, 1990, at 34.
147. Two Tracs to Progress, supra note 138, at 1-2.
148. EG-EFTA: Kommissionen har Skiirpt Tonen, EG-INFORMATION FOR SVERIGE,
KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNA, No. 2, June, 1990, at 1. In addition
to the EFTA countries' demands for certain exceptions to the EEC's laws governing the
single internal market, the EFTA countries have also declared that they are unwilling to
adjust some of their standards downward, such as product, machinery and environmental
standards. Rather, the EFTA countries argue that the harmonization of standards should be
made at the highest possible level. In other words, if an EEC standard is lower than a stan-
dard in a particular EFTA country, such country shall be able to maintain its higher stan-
dard. It is highly unlikely that the EEC will accept these demands. Id.
149. Petzell, Eftakrav Oroar EG, Svenska Dagbladet, July 26, 1990, § 1, at 4, col. 4.
150. See Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 116.
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lations must be incorporated into an already in-force EES agree-
ment.' 5' One alternative is to create a common legislative body
which could enact legislation that would be directly applicable' 52 in
all eighteen EES countries.' 53 A second alternative would be to en-
act "secondary" EES rules through separate international agree-
ments."' If needed, provisions of such agreements would then have
to be implemented into the municipal legal orders by the signatory
parties' respective government. 155 This issue will be discussed fur-
ther in the next section.
In addition to these issues, a new agreement must also cover the
relationship between the individual EFTA countries' 6 and the
treatment of already existing agreements between the parties. 157
2. Administrative, Legislative and Judicial Arrangements
Within the EES. Administrative and legislative arrangements must
be made concerning the implementation of laws governing the EES,
changes in such laws, and the enactment of new laws. Furthermore,
judicial arrangements must be made concerning interpretation of
EES law and resolution of disputes. Accordingly, at the outset, it
would seem that various common institutions are needed. In fact,
Delors referred to "common decision-making and administrative in-
stitutions" to make a new partnership more effective. 158 Today,
however, the EEC is no longer talking about a partnership with
common institutions, but rather about a partnership resting on
"two pillars" - the EEC and the EFTA - where each party creates
its own institutions which then will work together on issues con-
cerning the EES.159 This means that the EFTA, as such, must
strengthen its internal structure.
As was discussed above, an EES agreement would have to pro-
151. Id.
152. Note from the discussion above that for a rule of law covered by an international
agreement to be directly applicable means that it is part of the country's municipal legal
system. Being directly applicable, the rule of law is then capable of producing direct effect
(i.e., capable of being invoked by a private party before a domestic court).
153. Norberg, Rautsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 116.
154. Id.
155. As was discussed above, implementation of provisions of internal agreements
would have to be made by those countries which adhere to the dualist system, i.e., Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
156. This is different from the FTAs which do not treat the relationship between the
individual EFTA countries. Rather, the relationship between the individual EFTA countries
is governed by the EFTA Convention.
157. Norberg, Rfrttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 116.
158. Rendez-vous at Hol/nenkollen, supra note 12, at 1.
159. Petzell, supra note 149, § 1, at 4, col. 4.
1990]
25
Nervell: The Emerging European Economic Space: A Proposed Legal Framework
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
vide procedures for the drafting and implementation of "second-
ary" EES rules once an agreement with the "primary" EES rules is
in force. As new laws are enacted within the EEC concerning its
single internal market and which also concern the EES, such laws
will ultimately affect the individual EFTA countries. x6 Conse-
quently, the EFTA countries want to participate in the EEC's legis-
lative process on issues concerning the EES. However, according to
the EEC Commission, joint decisionmaking is not provided for
under the Rome Treaty, and will under no circumstances be al-
lowed."' 1 Rather, according to the EEC's "initial" proposal, the
EFTA countries would participate in the shaping of EEC legisla-
tion affecting the EES. The EEC Commission would "consult" with
the EFTA countries both at the drafting stage and before the pro-
posal was later voted upon by the EEC Council; but the EFTA
countries would be excluded from the actual decisionmaking
process.162
Today, however, the EEC is no longer talking about "consulta-
tion" but merely about "exchange of information." ' 3 The reason is
that the EEC Commission fears that if the EFTA countries were to
participate in the EEC's decisionmaking process through consulta-
tions, the process would slow down. Furthermore, the European
Parliament fears that if the EEC Council of Ministers and the
EFTA countries were to agree on a new law, the Parliament would
in practice be unable to amend it.'" Consequently, if the EFTA
countries were to be consulted on every law, this would hamper the
development of the EEC's single internal market.
Concerning the judicial arrangements within the EES, during ne-
gotiations between the two blocs the idea of establishing a special
EES court has been discussed.165 Although this court would be in-
dependent with justices from both the EEC and the EFTA coun-
tries, it would be annexed to the European Court of Justice in Lux-
embourg in the sense that it would have its seat and administration
160. See Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 117. See also
Unequal Partners, supra note 135, at 62.
161. Unequal Partners, supra note 135, at 62. It should be mentioned that some repre-
sentatives of the EEC Commission have stated that the EFTA countries' demand for joint
decision making on issues concerning the EES is reasonable and should be provided. How-
ever, it is highly unlikely that the EEC Parliament or the EEC Council would approve an
agreement granting joint decisionmaking power. Paketldsning som Bade Lockar och Skrdm-
mer, supra note 146, at 34.
162. Lindmarker, supra note 13, § 2, at 6, col. 7.
163. Taylor, Den Exclusiva Klubben, TEMPUS, July 19-25, 1990, § 4, at 11, col. 4.
164. Twelve or Twenty-four?, THE EcONOMIST, July 7, 1990, at 12.
165. Lindmarker, supra note 13, § 2, at 6.
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in Luxembourg. 6 ' However, because the EEC is no longer talking
about common institutions, it seems unlikely that the EC Court of
Justice and the other Community institutions would actually agree
to this type of an arrangement.
3. Some General Remarks Concerning the Realization of a Wide
Ranging EES Agreement. Although the two blocs are in agreement
that participation by the EFTA countries in the EEC's single inter-
nal market would be mutually beneficial, it is questionable whether
the EES, as initially envisaged with common decisionmaking and
administrative instifutions governing a wide ranging relationship,
can actually become a reality. As discussed above, sharp disagree-
ments exist between the parties concerning the EFTA countries'
participation in the EEC's decisionmaking process. By signing on to
an EES agreement, the EFTA countries, subject to certain excep-
tions, are accepting the laws ("primary" laws) governing the EEC's
single internal market. However, new rules and regulations ("sec-
ondary" laws) will be adopted by the Community and, under an
EES agreement, these laws must also be accepted. The EFTA
countries want to be able to influence the EEC's decisionmaking
process so that they do not to have to accept laws that are solely
the product of the Community. However, the EEC's position is
that, regardless of the EFTA countries' loss of sovereignty, the
Rome Treaty does not provide for joint decisionmaking and will not
be provided. Because none of the parties seem willing to change
their position, some are arguing that this issue might break the ne-
gotiations, resulting in no agreement."6 7
Furthermore, there are other issues creating problems in the ne-
gotiations between the two blocs. One problem is the lack of unity
within the EFTA. In contrast to the bilateral FTAs, a multilateral
agreement such as an EES agreement requires a stronger internal
structure within the EFTA as an organization."6 8 As was indicated
166. Id.
167. Taylor, supra note 163, § 4, at 11, col. 4. See also, Twelve or Twenty-four?,
supra note 164, at 12.
168. In its negotiations with the EFTA countries, the EEC has made it clear that the
EFTA must act as one organization and that means strengthening the internal structure of
the EFTA as such. One demand made by the EEC Commission is that the EFTA countries
create a common structure for enacting and enforcing EEC rules of competition. This means,
inter alia, the establishment of an institution which oversees state subsidies and which can
act on a collective basis. Another demand made by the EEC is that the EFTA establishes its
own "Commission" to oversee and enforce EES rules and regulations, and to serve as the
EFTA's communication organ with the EEC. Paketl~sning som Bade Lockar och Skram-
mer, supra note 146, at 34.
1990]
27
Nervell: The Emerging European Economic Space: A Proposed Legal Framework
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
earlier, the EEC has demanded that the EFTA countries act jointly
and speak with one voice. However, Switzerland does not share the
same ideas concerning a closer relationship with the EEC as do the
remaining EFTA countries, thus making it difficult to fulfill this
demand. While Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Austria
have all agreed to make some adjustments in their lists of excep-
tions to the various areas to be covered by an EES agreement,
Switzerland, whose list of exceptions is more expansive than any of
the other EFTA countries, wants to begin constructive negotiations
with the EEC without making any adjustments. "' As an example,
Switzerland is unwilling to accept the free movement of persons,
which is one of the four freedoms in the EEC's single internal mar-
ket. Furthermore, Switzerland is unwilling to accept the EEC's
rules of competition. Switzerland also wants to maintain its bank
secrecy laws and its strict laws on foreign acquisitions of Swiss cor-
porations. 170 Therefore, due to lack of unity among the EFTA
countries, it might be difficult to satisfy the EEC's demands for a
stronger internal structure of the EFTA. In fact, the EEC has al-
ready stated that it is highly critical of the EFTA countries' lack of
quick response to the internal inadequacies of the'EFTA. 171
Another problem is that the interest of the EES is slowly begin-
ning to fade among the EFTA countries as a majority of the EFTA
countries are contemplating the possibility of membership in the
EEC.172 By becoming members of the EEC, the EFTA countries
would be able both to participate in the single internal market and
also have a say in the EEC's decisionmaking process. Austria ap-
plied for membership in the summer of 1989 and the application
may be processed sooner than initially expected.173 Of the other
EFTA countries, Norway seems to be the next country most likely
to apply for membership.1 71 In Sweden, it seems that it is no longer
169. Schweiz Tjurighet kan Spricka EES-Avtal, AFFARSVARLDEN, No. 24-25, June
13, 1990, at 33.
170. Id.
171. EG-EFTA: Kommissionen har Skdrpt Tonen, supra note 148, at 1.
172. See The Norseman Cometh?, supra note 136, at 50.
173. Schweiz Tjurighet kan Sprdcka EES-Avtal, supra note 169, at 33.
174. See supra note 31 for a reference to Norway's earlier attempt to apply for mem-
bership. As a NATO member, Norway does not have the same problems of neutrality as
Finland and Sweden. However, an application for membership is dependent upon the Labor
party, which is the largest party and currently against membership. According to Mrs. Gro
Harlem Brundtland, leader of the Labor party, membership may be of interest if the EFTA
countries will not be able to influence the EEC's decisionmaking process. If and when the
Labor party gives approval for membership, the party will have the support of the Conserva-
tives and the Progress party resulting in a pro-membership majority in the Norwegian parlia-
ment. The Norseman Cometh? supra note 136, at 50.
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a question "if" Sweden will join the EEC but rather "when" it will
join.175 In Finland, discussions have surfaced indicating that mem-
bership is a realistic, although distant, possibility.1 76 Even Switzer-
land, which historically has always been strongly against suprana-
tional organizations,177 has recognized that it has not ruled out the
possibility of EEC membership.1 78
While most of the EFTA countries are considering EEC mem-
bership, the EEC is at the same time beginning to change its posi-
tion regarding additional members. Based on recent EEC meetings,
there seems to be a common understanding that it is no longer pos-
sible to exclude new members from the Community.1 79 However,
despite any changes in the EEC's position towards new members, it
must be recognized that new members are not likely to be admitted
until its current projects are completed. Furthermore, the EEC's
decisionmaking process is known for being remarkably slow,1 80 thus
new members may not be admitted during the 1990s.
Consequently, even though the idea of the EES may not seem as
attractive as it did when initially introduced, an EES agreement
could still provide a temporary solution to the problems of Euro-
pean economic integration. "A characteristic feature of the devel-
opment of EEC-EFTA cooperation is a pragmatic approach and
enlarged cooperation on a step-by-step basis."'' Furthermore,
some of the more moderate Eastern bloc nations are likely to want
to participate in the trade network of Western Europe on similar
conditions as the Western European countries, and solutions must
175. The ruling Social Democrats have held the position that the country's neutrality
policy and EEC membership are incompatible. Thus, the party wants a successful completion
of a wide ranging EES agreement. However, an increasing number of members are recogniz-
ing that the EES can only serve as a temporary solution during a transition period. Taylor,
To Join or Not to Join the EC, Financial Times, July 3, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 2-3.
176. The Norseman Cometh?, supra note 136, at 50.
177. Jonsson, supra note 7, at 61.
178. EES-Avtal kan Bara bli Tillfadlig L sning, supra note 136, at 26.
179. Schweiz Tjurighet kan Spracka EES-Avtal, supra note 169, at 33. Helmut Kohl,
Germany's Canceler, has specifically stated that the EEC must be open to such countries as
Austria, Sweden, Norway and Finland. Utspel och Eftambte ger EG-Debatten Ny Fart, AF-
FARSVXRLDEN, No. 24-25, June 13, 1990, at 32. Within the EEC Commission, there used to
be a consensus against new members. Today, however, Leon Brittan and Bruce Millan
(Great Britain), Filippo Maria Pandolfi and Carlo Ripa di Meana (Italy), Karel Van Miert
(Belgium), and Henning Christophersen (Denmark) are favoring preparatory negotiations
with Austria. Only Jacques Delors (France) and Frans Andriessen (Netherlands) remain
strongly against new members. The Makings of a New Constellation, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
4, 1990, at 41.
180. See Norberg, Rdttsliga och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 117.
181. Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries,
supra note 36, at 568.
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be found to integrate those countries. Hungary, for example, may
seek to join the EFTA.'82 Thus, even if some of the current EFTA
members become members of the EEC, the EFTA as an organiza-
tion will most likely continue with new member countries and an
EES agreement would allow those countries to participate, to some
extent, in the EEC's single internal market. Furthermore, an EES
agreement will give the EEC some breathing space to complete its
internal market. Therefore, both parties have an incentive in suc-
cessfully completing an EES agreement within the next few years.
The question then becomes: What will be the nature of an EES
agreement? Most likely, a new agreement will be more narrow in
scope than initially projected. Because most EFTA countries are
contemplating EEC membership, there is less incentive for making
those adjustments necessary for a more ambitious agreement. Also,
because not all of the EFTA countries are in agreement concerning
the scope of an EES agreement, an agreement will most likely only
cover those areas where a consensus can be reached and remaining
areas will have to be covered through separate bilateral agreements
between the EEC and individual EFTA countries. Thus, an EES
agreement is likely to become an expanded version of the FTAs.
C. The Need for a Stronger Legal Framework Even Under a
Less Ambitious EES Agreement
As was discussed earlier, the lack of adequate dispute resolution
procedures under the FTAs has created difficulties in ensuring pri-
vate parties equal rights and protections, and these difficulties
might be even more visible if the relationship is to cover more areas
than the FTAs. Thus, even under a less ambitious EES agreement,
some sort of a dispute resolution procedure must still be provided.
As stated above, implementation of agreements between the EEC
and the EFTA countries into municipal law is only a first step in
establishing a more concrete legal framework for expanded EEC-
EFTA relations. This would then make it possible for EES actors
to invoke EES rules of law before domestic courts in all eighteen
182. Inotai, EFTA and East-West Economic Relations, EFTA BULL., No. 3, July-
Sept. 1989, at 10. Lately there have been indications that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland may seek EEC membership. Twelve or Twenty-four?, supra note 164, at 19. The
EEC is in fact offering those countries "association agreements." The Makings of a New
Constellation, supra note 179, at 41. However, rather than dealing separately with the East-
ern bloc countries and the EFTA countries, the EEC might prefer to deal with those coun-
tries collectively under an EES agreement. See Prokesch, Western Europe Moves to Expand
Free-Trade Links, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
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EES countries; however, this is not enough. To guarantee private
parties equal rights and protection, EES actors must have access to
a common procedure for resolving disputes. As was discussed
above, one alternative is a court; however, the realization of such a
court seems unlikely. Another alternative is an arbitration
procedure.
The idea of establishing an arbitration procedure to resolve dis-
putes between EEC and EFTA actors is not new. The idea was first
introduced during the negotiations of the FTAs.188 Switzerland has
since then continued to pursue the idea. 1 4 But since the concept of
creating the EES was initially presented, it has been the general
opinion that a new relationship of this magnitude requires some-
thing more extensive than an arbitration procedure; preferably a
permanent court such as an EES court discussed above."8 5 How-
ever, because an EES agreement is likely to become only an ex-
panded version of the FTAs rather than an ambitious agreement
with common institutions, an arbitration procedure seems to be the
most suitable and realistic alternative.
Furthermore, establishing an arbitration procedure would provide
a suitable dispute resolution mechanism if in the future the EES
would be comprised of some of the more moderate Eastern Euro-
pean countries. As those countries begin the lengthy process of
shifting towards a market-oriented economy, a suitable dispute res-
olution procedure must be available. With parties from two ex-
tremely different legal systems, and with the goal of economic inte-
gration, arbitration rather than litigation would be the preferable
way of resolving disputes. Arbitration is suitable because it provides
a neutral forum for parties of different nationalities, ethnic back-
ground, and legal systems, to resolve their disputes without fear of
partiality by the courts of the forum state. 186
By including an arbitration procedure in a new EES agreement,
private parties could raise alleged violations of EES rules or regula-
tions and, if no settlement could be reached through consultations,
the parties could formally request that the dispute be submitted to
183. Danelius, supra note 39, at 110.
184. Bernitz, The Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries,
supra note 36, at 571.
185. See Bernitz, Harmonization Between the EEC and the EFTA Countries, supra
note 9, at 100; Bernitz, Sveriges EG-Anknytning, supra note 71, at 68; Norberg, Rattsliga
och Institutionella Fragor, supra note 9, at 122.
186. Hoellering, Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, 14 N.Y.U.
REv, L. & SOC. CHANGE, 785, 785 (1986).
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arbitration. Each party would then select one arbitrator and those
two arbitrators would then select a third arbitrator. A decision
would be based on the laws provided by an EES agreement and any
other agreements between the parties, and such a decision would be
binding.
One problem, however, with establishing an arbitration proce-
dure is the potential development of conflicting decisions by an ar-
bitration tribunal and the European Court of Justice. This problem
was one of the reasons why the EEC opposed any type of wide-
scale independent dispute resolution procedure to be included in the
FTAs. 187 Most likely, the EEC would raise this concern again.
However, since the FTAs entered into force, the EEC has accepted
independent dispute resolution procedures in a number of separate
bilateral agreements with EFTA countries.' One agreement in-
cluding such a procedure is the agreement on fisheries between the
EEC and Sweden. 8 9 Although the EEC may raise the concern of a
divergence in decisions, opposition may not be as strong today as it
was during the negotiations of the FTAs.
187. See Norberg, Experiences and Problems, supra note 4, at 11.
188. Id.
189. Article 7 of the Agreement on Fisheries between the EEC and Sweden provides
that:
1. The Parties agree to consult on questions relating to the implementation and
proper functioning of this Agreement.
2. In the event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Agreement such a dispute shall be the subject of consultations between the Parties.
If no settlement is reached following such consultations, and where it is claimed that
a Party has manifestly failed to comply with specific provisions or conditions estab-
lished by the present Agreement, the dispute shall be the subject of arbitration
under the conditions laid down in the Annex, provided that sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing living resources within
their fishery zones shall not be called in question.
The Annex to the Agreement provides that:
Within two months from the date on which either Party has formally requested that
a dispute be submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 7(2) of the Agree-
ment, each Party shall appoint one member of the arbitral tribunal and these two
members shall, within three months from the same date, agree upon a national of a
third State as third member to be appointed by the two Parties.
The arbitral tribunal shall on the basis of the present Agreement and of other rules
of international law, reach its decisions by a majority of votes. Such decisions shall
be binding. Although the cost of the arbitral tribunal shall normally be borne in
equal parts by both Parties, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to rule otherwise
concerning cost. In all other respects, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own
organization and procedure.
23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 226) 6 (1980).
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THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE
CONCLUSION
The FTAs between the two European trade blocs have, since the
early 1970s, provided the foundation for EEC-EFTA cooperation.
In the Luxembourg Declaration of 1984, Ministers from the EEC,
its member states, and the EFTA countries agreed that cooperation
between the two blocs should be expanded beyond the FTAs with
the goal of ultimately creating a dynamic and homogeneous Euro-
pean Economic Space. However, expanding the relationship beyond
the FTAs requires a stronger legal framework than what currently
exists under the FTAs. First, in order to produce direct effect, pro-
visions under international agreements entered into by the EEC
and the EFTA countries must be implemented into municipal law
in all eighteen countries. Second, even if private parties were to be
able to invoke provisions under agreements between the two blocs
before domestic courts, to ensure equal rights and protections pri-
vate parties must still have access to a common procedure for
resolving disputes. The type of resolution procedure that might be
established depends to some degree on how successful the EEC and
the EFTA are in negotiating a new agreement. However, for the
reasons discussed above, a new agreement is likely to be less ambi-
tious than what was first envisioned, and under this type of an
agreement, arbitration would be a suitable dispute resolution
procedure.
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